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Agenda Setting In Supreme Court Tax Cases:
Lessons From the Blackmun Papers
NANCY C. STAUDTt
Justices on the Supreme Court have extraordinary
control over their agenda-the rules governing the Court's
jurisdiction on writ of certiorari explicitly provide that
review is "not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion."'
This agenda setting power means the Justices are at liberty
to grant as many-or as few-petitions of certiorari as they
see fit and are free to hear only the legal disputes they find
the most intellectually fascinating. Indeed, the Court theo-
retically has freedom to hear just a handful cases in a single
area of the law each term or it could hear hundreds, per-
haps even thousands, across the legal spectrum. Docket
control, however, has not led the Justices to seek out the
cases they find particularly intriguing while eschewing all
others from their courtroom. Actually quite the opposite is
true: while the Justices have granted certiorari to more tax
controversies than any other area of the law involving a
single statute, they describe these cases as the "crud"3 on
the docket-the cases that "put law clerks to sleep."
t Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I owe thanks to Lee
Epstein and to the staff at the Library of Congress, all of whom greatly
facilitated this research. I also thank the editors of the Buffalo Law Review for
inviting me to participate in their inaugural issue of essays addressing topics
"in the neighborhood of the law."
1. SuP. CT. R. 10. The Court did not always have full discretion to set its
agenda, this came about just 75 years ago with the adoption of the Judiciary Act
of 1925. See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. For a
terrific historical discussion of the certiorari process, see Edward A. Hartnett,
Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges'
Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000).
2. The Court has granted certiorari to nearly 250 tax disputes since 1952
and has heard nearly as many controversies implicating the National Labor
Relations Act, but far less in other statutory areas of the law, including
controversies involving the Bankruptcy Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Sherman act, and the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The figure below
shows the frequency of cases that reach the Supreme Court in these different
contexts.
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To add insult to injury, students of taxation routinely
deride the high court for "bungling" the tax cases they
decide to hear. So inept at understanding complex taxation
issues, scholars claim that the Justices frequently issue
opinions that are "needlessly confusing,"8 should "be con-
signed to the judicial scrap heap,"7 and have become the
"laughingstock" of the tax bar.' These criticisms have been
so widespread and enduring that many commentators
- wA50, 0
4o024 24050
Lee Epstein, Nancy Staudt, & Peter Wiedenbeck, Judging Statutes: Thoughts
on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue
Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 305, 309 (2003) (noting the large number of tax
cases in the Supreme Court warrants scholarly attention).
3. "If one's in the doghouse with the Chief, he gets the crud. He gets the tax
cases and some of the Indian cases, which I like, but I've had a lot of them."
BrainyQuote, www.brainyquote.comquotes/authors/hfharry-a blackmun.html;
see also, Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice and "Boring" Cases, 4
THE GREEN BAG 2d 401 (2001) (commenting on the fact that the Justices find
tax cases boring).
4. Container 612, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. (Supreme Court clerk comment on preliminary
memorandum circulated to Court in Commissioner v. Soliman, a case involving
an anesthesiologist seeking a home office deduction. The author added the
following notation after each party's name: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
("puts law clerks to sleep") v. Soliman ("puts patients to sleep")).
5. Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson,
54 TAx L. REV. 171, 173 (2001) ("Tax lawyers have derided the Supreme Court,
complaining that the Court 'hates tax cases' and generally bungles the cases it
does hear.").
6. Joel Newman, The Story of Welch: The Use (and Misuse) of the "Ordinary
and Necessary" Test for Deducting Business Expenses, in TAX STORIES 181 (Paul
L. Caron, ed., 2003).
7. Id.
8. Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of
Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1099-1100 (1981) ("A Supreme
Court opinion ought not become the basis for tax lawyers to make a
laughingstock of the Court as they now do when quite routinely they add
unnecessary third parties to financing transactions in order to qualify for the
shelter of Frank Lyon.").
argue it is unrealistic to expect the Justices to develop a
sophisticated tax jurisprudence;' rather, Congress should
curtail, if not eliminate, the Court's jurisdiction over tax
matters-perhaps through the creation of a National Court
of Tax Appeals with final resort to the Supreme Court seri-
ously abridged. °
If the Supreme Court dislikes tax cases so much and at
the same time issues decisions that generate more confu-
sion than clarity, why does it continue to grant certiorari to
such a relatively large number of taxation disputes? This
question invites speculation as to why the Justices make
decisions the way they do; it calls for an explanation of the
seemingly irrational process that leads Justices-with
virtually complete control over their docket-to hear cases
they find tedious and boring when they could avoid them
altogether. Of course, we cannot get into the Justices' minds
to answer this query but we can access motive through a
variety of other techniques including conducting interviews
of the Justices and their law clerks, examining published
court opinions that recite reasons for granting certiorari, 2
and using statistical models to identify the variables that
correlate with the decision to hear a case. 3 Scholars have
9. Id. at 1100.
10. See, e.g., Oscar Bland, Federal Tax Appeals, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1013
(1925) (criticizing the federal tax litigation process as clumsy and time-
consuming and arguing for a single court with national jurisdiction over all tax
disputes); Gary W. Carter, The Commissioner's Nonaquiescence: A Case for a
National Court of Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879 (1986) (arguing problems unique
to taxation should lead Congress to pursue legislation authorizing National
Court of Tax Appeals); Charles L.B. Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the
Supreme Court, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 222, 222 ("The thesis of this paper is simple:
It is time to rescue the Supreme Court from federal taxation; it is time to rescue
federal taxation from the Supreme Court."). But see Theodore Tannenwald, Jr.
The Tax Litigation Process: Where It Is and Where It Is Going, 44 THE RECORD
833-46 (1989) (examining case for and against National Court of Tax Appeals
and opposing reform).
11. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING To DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991) (interviewing five Justices, sixty four
law clerks, and others with regard to the certiorari process).
12. See Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court
Judicial Database 1953-2002 Terms, http://www.polisci.msu.edu/
pljp/sctcode.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004) (offering a wealth of information
about Supreme Court decisions, including variables identifying Court's reasons
for granting certiorari).
13. See Gregory Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988) (using a
statistical model to analyze empirical data).
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relied on these techniques in the past and have uncovered a
range of intriguing explanations for judicial decisions at the
certiorari phase of Supreme Court litigation. The extant
literature, however, focuses on the factors that make a peti-
tion "cert-worthy" as a general matter and when scholars do
concentrate on judicial concerns that relate to a specific
issue area, they focus on civil rights and not legal disputes
that arise in contexts such as taxation.' This is unfortunate
because the reasons for granting or denying certiorari in
business cases may well differ from those that counsel for
and against hearing a civil rights dispute-after all, thelegal, economic, and political interests associated with these
two areas often diverge and the implications of deciding (or
refusing to decide) a civil rights case are different from
those in the business context. Moreover, none of the studies
help to clarify why the Justices seem to prioritize disputes
emanating from the tax code over other laws when, by all
accounts, we would expect the Court to shun them.
In this essay, I investigate the factors that explain the
Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari to federal tax
controversies and, to this end, I look to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun's papers for purposes of understanding the judi-
cial mind."5 The Library of Congress opened the papers to
the public just this year, and as it turns out, Justice Black-
mun meticulously and carefully kept files on nearly every
aspect of his judicial career.'6 He retained notes, emails,
14. Even authors that investigate the certiorari decision in a single issue-
area ignore explanations that may be unique to the particular legal question
and focus instead on broad explanatory variables such as decisional conflict or
the presence of the Solicitor General as a party in the case. See, e.g., Robert M.
Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy
Certiorari, 62 Mo. L. REV. 101 (1997) (examining certiorari decisions in
bankruptcy but failing to control for factors unique to this area, such as the
amount of debt at issue or the type of expenditures incurred).
15. Harry Blackmun was born on November 12, 1908. President Nixon
nominated Blackmun to the Supreme Court and on June 9, 1970 he was sworn
in as the 102nd Justice. After serving 24 years on the Court as an Associate
Justice, Blackmun retired on August 3, 1994. He died on March 4, 1999. He
replaced Abe Fortas and was replaced by Stephen Breyer. See Harry A.
Blackmun: A Register of His Papers in the Library of Congress, at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/blackmun/ (Connie L. Cartledge ed., 2003) (last
visited Oct. 11, 2004). For a discussion of Justice Blackmun's work in the tax
area while on the Supreme Court, see Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun's
Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1998).
16. Several of the Supreme Court Justices retained papers and files that
indicate how each individual Justice voted on the writ of certiorari, but the files
892 [Vol. 52
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memoranda, conference vote tallies, correspondence, and
much more on each and every issue the Court considered
between 1970-1993, the years he served as an Associate
Justice on the United States Supreme Court. 17 In my review
of the papers, I uncovered countless fascinating documents
and letters-from commentary about individual litigants'
verbal talents (or lack thereof);8 to intra-Court predictions
about tax outcomes during oral argument;19 to vote changes
for purposes of getting "solid court opinions."2
do not contain systematic evidence associated with the arguments for and
against the decisions found in documents such as the preliminary memoranda.
See, e.g., Barbara Palmer, The "Bermuda Triangle?" The Cert Pool and Its
Influence over the Supreme Court's Agenda, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 105, 109
(2001) (indicating that Justice Powell's papers contain preliminary memoranda,
but only for cases in which the Court granted plenary review); see also Stark,
supra note 5, at 245 (discussing the certiorari decision in Cobb v Comm'r, 338
U.S. 832 (1949), which suggests Justice Jackson's papers contain information
about the certiorari decision).
17. Justice Blackmun's papers are housed in 1,576 boxes in the Library of
Congress. Harry A. Blackmun: A Register of His Papers in the Library of
Congress, Containers 1-1576, (2003) (housed in the Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). The documents were given to the
Library of Congress in 1997 and physically transferred between 1999-2000; the
Library opened the files for public viewing in March, 2003. See Harry A.
Blackmun: A Register of His Papers in the Library of Congress, supra note 15.
For a brief profile of the Blackmun files, see Blackmun Papers: Humor in the
Court (National Public Radio Broadcast March 7, 2004) available at
www.npr.org/features/feature.php?wfld=1751150 (last visited Oct. 11, 2004)
("Blackmun's papers, which include notes he and other justices jotted to each
other during oral arguments, show a human, often humorous, side to the court.
They also shed light on dramatic legal battles, including Chief Justice William
Rehnquist's repeated efforts to weaken Roe.... Most of the business of the
nation's highest court is deadly serious, but members occasionally allow
themselves a little levity. As acting Chief Justice, Blackmun once scheduled
square dancing at the Supreme Court building and ordered the court cat to
chase Boris, 'the rat upstairs'.") Id. With regard to the massive amount of
documents Justice Blackmun returned, the news reporters noted: "he kept
things that none of us would keep. He kept his tennis scores with [Chief
Justice] Warren Burger from when they were kids. He kept his dance cards and
notebooks from Harvard. He would clip things and put them in the files about
all of his colleagues. I wish I had a clipping service like Harry Blackmun. He
was compulsive about it." Id.
18. Container 578, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C. (commenting on lawyers' verbal skills during
oral argument and noting that the case was "well-argued"); Container 621,
Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. (Justice Blackmun notes during oral argument that he can
hardly hear counsel and writes "I may has well have stayed in my office").
19. Container 1150, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Justice Blackmun asked Justice Brennan to
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In this essay I focus exclusively on the "preliminary
memoranda" to gain purchase on the Court's decision to
grant certiorari to the federal tax cases. The preliminary
memoranda (usually, called "cert pool memos") address the
arguments for and against granting certiorari and are
authored by a single Justice's law clerk, but are circulated
to nearly the entire Court for review.2 Upon receiving these
memoranda, Justice Blackmun instructed his law clerks to
review the documents, write comments in the margins
regarding the arguments set forth, and make a separate
recommendation on the question of certiorari for each case.
I do not rely on the law clerks' recommendations in the
memoranda for understanding judicial votes; rather I focus
on the arguments set forth for purposes of understanding
possible judicial rationales for granting or denying a full
hearing.
The preliminary memos suggest three factors play a
strong role in the Court's decision to hear a tax case on the
merits. First (and somewhat predictably) the Justices look
to inter-court conflict when deciding whether or not to grant
certiorari on a particular legal issue. Second (and much
more surprising) the Justices nearly always consider the
impact of the lower court decision on the federal fisc-in
other words, what is the cost of not hearing the case. As the
cost increases, the Justices appear more likely to grant cer-
tiorari.23 Finally, the papers highlight judicial deference to
predict case outcome in Davis v. United States-Justice Brennan predicted the
IRS would prevail and his prediction was accurate.).
20. Container 565, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Chief Justice Rehnquist decides to switch his
vote to assure strong majority opinion in Cheek v. U.S.).
21. For a brief discussion of the origins of the pool memo, see David M.
O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court'sShrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J. L. & Pol. 779, 798-806 (1997) (discussing both
origins and controversies surrounding the Court's reliance on the cert pool
memorandum for purposes of granting or denying petitions); see also Palmer,
supra note 16, at 105-19 (discussing cert pool memos and their impact on
Justices' votes).
22. In fact, the Justices often did ignore the clerk's recommendation and
these cases may be particularly informative of the certiorari process. See infra
text accompanying note 84 (discussing case in which law clerk recommended
against a full hearing but Court granted writ of certiorari).
23. See infra notes 29-62 and accompanying text (authors ignore role of
costs in Supreme Court decision making); but see ROBERT STERN, EUGENE
CRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, & KENNETH S. GELLER, SUPREME COURTPRACTICE 248-49 (2002) (noting the fact that especially large amounts of money
894 [Vol. 52
895AGENDA SETTING
the Solicitor General's office-especially when the govern-
ment supports a plenary hearing as a respondent who won
on the merits in the court below. The existing studies on
certiorari, in both law and the social science literatures,
investigate the role of conflict, but entirely ignore the
impact that fiscal costs or litigants' atypical legal positions
may have on the Court's decision making process. Accord-
ingly, I briefly explore whether this new information should
affect the way scholars understand agenda setting in the
Supreme Court, as well as the proposals set forth advocat-
ing congressional limits on the Court's jurisdiction over tax
disputes.
Justice Blackmun's papers are filled with important
and new information that may well impact the way we
think about business in the Supreme Court. The goals of
this essay, however, are modest and I want to make them
clear. I examined only the federal tax cases to which the
Court granted a plenary review between the years 1986 and
1993.2' This means that my data set is very small (the Court
decided forty-one tax cases during that time period) and at
the same time I have reviewed only the cases in which the
litigants successfully argued for certiorari-not the cases
that failed to get a full hearing on the merits. By selecting
on the dependent variable (the very thing I hope to explain),
I cannot be sure that the newly uncovered data actually
impacts the Court's decision making process: to answer this
question, further data collection and additional analysis is
necessary. Accordingly, this essay is largely limited to
profiling the Blackmun papers and offering insight into
possible new areas of research, but it does not (and cannot)
offer firm conclusions about the judicial motivations un-
derlying the certiorari decision. With these limitations in
mind, my investigation of Supreme Court agenda setting
unfolds as follows. Section I briefly describes Supreme
Court Rule 10, which governs review on a writ of certiorari,
and then offers a summary of the law and social science
literature that investigates agenda setting in the Supreme
Court. Section II outlines the data uncovered in Justice
Blackmun's papers indicating how the Court uses Rule 10
in federal taxation controversies. In this section, I note that
involved in litigation over the issue of statutory construction may also be a
"persuasive factor" in the Court's certiorari decision).
24. For an explanation of why I chose this time period, see infra note 63.
2004]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
the Blackmun files indicate certain factors play an impor-tant role in the Court's decision to grant or deny certiorari,but scholars ignore these factors in their discussion of theCourt's certiorari procedures. Accordingly, in Section III, Iinvestigate possible avenues for future research-both
normative and descriptive-that account for the archival
evidence I uncovered. In conclusion, I offer brief comments
on why Supreme Court Justices are inclined to give plenaryhearings to tax cases when they find this area of the law so
dull.
I. REVIEW ON WRIT CERTIORARI: SUPREME COURT RULE 10
Rule 10 of the Supreme Court of the United States gov-Serns the Court's jurisdiction on writs of certiorari. Itprovides that in exercising discretion, the Court will rarelygrant a certiorari petition solely on the grounds that alower court made erroneous factual findings or misapplied a
rule of law." Rather than pursuing an error correctionstrategy that assures the accuracy of all rulings in a givenyear on a particular issue of federal law, Rule 10 indicatesthat the Court will grant certiorari only for "compelling rea-
sons. "26 While the Court rules do not describe in clear terms
exactly which cases the Justices will deem compelling, theydo indicate the character of such cases-cases that involvejudicial decisions in "conflict" on matters of "importance."27
25. SuP. CT. R. 10.26. Id. While Rule 10 suggests the Court will not pursue an error correction
strategy as to factual findings, the justices do, of course, grant certiorari tocorrect erroneous legal conclusions. Empirical studies suggest the cert decision,however, is tied to politics and probabilities. See, e.g., John F. Krol & SaulBrenner, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: AReevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335, 335-42 (1990) (arguing that evidence suggestsJustices who want to reverse the lower court will vote to grant certiorari while aJustice who agrees with the lower court will vote to deny). See also LAWRENCEBAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 79 (1997) (same). But see H.W. PERRY,DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT(1980) (discussing an interview with Justices and law clerks suggestingcertiorari votes are based on the probability of winning on the merits); Robert L.Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic DecisionMakers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J.POL. 824-37 (1995) (arguing that Justices consider probability of winning on themerits and not just their disagreement with lower court outcomes in certiorari
decision making).
27. SUP. CT. R. 10.
896
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Specifically, the relevant portion of Rule 10 for certiorari
petitions raising federal taxation issues provides that:
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for
compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling
nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character
of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) A United States court of appeals has entered a decision in
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals
on the same important matter ... or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court's supervisory power;
(c)... A United States court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.
Because Rule 10 "neither controls nor fully 
measures"
29
the Court's discretion, it sets no real boundaries, effectively
giving the Justices complete freedom to grant or deny a writ
of certiorari on any grounds whatsoever. As noted above,
however, the language of the rule suggests that the Court
will give special attention to cases that involve conflicting
judicial decisions on important legal matters.
It is easy to understand why conflict-whether between
circuit courts or with Supreme Court precedent-is a factor
that should play a role in the decision to grant certiorari,
both generally and in the taxation context specifically.
Many Court scholars argue that the federal government
must treat likes alike-in effect, fair legal results are tied to
28. Id.
29. See id.
20041
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uniformity of treatment irrespective of the individual'splace of residence or geographic location. Individuals
residing in the United States have the right to equality of
treatment and if federal courts treat two similar cases dif-ferently, then the judicial system has arguably produced atleast one unfair decision. ° Moreover, uniformity is valuablebecause it contributes to greater predictability and cer-tainty in the law. A predictable set of rules, in turn, struc-
tures interactions and encourages reliance among parties.This enables individuals to understand what to expect in
social and business interactions and to rely on those expec-tations rather than litigating every conflict that arises,
thereby unnecessarily expending private or judicial
resources.3 Finally, uniform rules foster respect for the ju-diciary; they require judges to render consistent outcomes
and ensure that judges draw on a body of law that repre-
sents the collective experience of the judiciary over time
rather than upon their own political or ideological view-points. Consequently, the public is more likely to view courtdecisions as fair and predictable rather than impulsive andfickle. 2 Consistency in outcome, therefore, leads to thepublic perception that the federal courts act responsibly andfor the greater good of society, rather than as politicalbodies intent on imposing their own views on society-at-large. Whether the perception rests on solid ground or not,is not the point-instead the idea is that federal judges tend
to seek legitimacy and will be successful only if judicial out-
comes appear grounded in fair laws and not individual
preferences."
In addition to fairness, efficiency, and judicial legiti-
macy problems associated with erratic decision making,inconsistency in the tax context promotes behavioral
changes that have their own costs. First, if tax deductions,
exclusions, or exemptions depend not on congressional lan-guage found in the tax code but on the jurisdiction in which
a taxpayer resides, individuals and corporations are likely
to respond by moving and reincorporating to the preferred
site. This reaction, in turn, will have an impact not only on
30. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a(Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 836-40 (2003)(discussing uniformity goals and describing existing literature on the topic).
31. Id. at 838.
32. Id. at 837-39.
33. Id. at 838-39.
898
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the federal budget, but also on state and local budgets as
the tax base moves from circuit to circuit given the differen-
tial effective tax rates, ultimately decreasing federal, state,
and local revenues.34 Second, with unique rules in each
jurisdiction, parties with national business interests may
avoid planning and pursuing business transactions given
the unpredictability of tax outcomes in the absence of a na-
tionally binding rule, thereby decreasing overall national
productivity.35 Third, even if parties do undertake commer-
cial dealings and endeavors, and litigation ensues from
these interactions, the parties are likely to engage in forum
shopping as a means to exploit the legal conflicts that
exist."
While variations of the above-described drawbacks of a
lack of uniformity exist in many legal contexts, statutory
rules unique to taxation lead to fairness problems that do
not exist elsewhere in the law. After litigating a case in fed-
eral court, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Service has the power to publish "nonacquiescence" letters
indicating the government will not accept a court decision
as precedent-even within the jurisdiction in which it was
issued!37 While the IRS is bound by Supreme Court rulings
and must respect these outcomes as controlling in future
34. Recognizing the drawbacks associated with decisional conflict, the
Supreme Court seems to give priority to cases that involve such tension. Of the
forty-one tax cases the Court decided between the years 1986-1994, it explicitly
noted the existence of just such a conflict on the face of the published opinion
and suggested that the Court's decision to hear the case was grounded, at least
in part, on this conflict in seventy-three percent of the cases. Moreover,
empirical studies published in the social science literature confirm the role of
conflict in the certiorari decision; although various other explanatory variables
play an important role, scholars have found that the existence of conflict is
highly statistically significant. See, e.g., Sidney S. Ulmer, The Supreme Court's
Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
901, 905 (1984) (examining cases with alleged and genuine inter-court conflict,
and finding a correlation with genuine conflict and the Court's decision to hear
a case on the merits).
35. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME
COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 57
(1986); Michael F. Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court's Certiorari
Jurisdiction in Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1265-74 (1988).
36. See ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 35, at 57; Sturley, supra note 35
at 1265-74.
37. Congress has never specifically authorized this procedure but the
government has long pursued it. See Carter, supra note 10, at 879-99
(discussing the Commissioner's authority to refuse to acquiesce to tax decisions
unless issued by the Supreme Court).
2004]
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litigation, this same constraint does not exist when a fed-
eral appellate court or the tax court issues the opinion-
these lower court rulings govern only with respect to theparty involved in a particular lawsuit. Put differently, theIRS is entitled to disregard most judicial opinions when the
opinion is not to its liking. This means, absent a SupremeCourt ruling, the government can and will treat taxpayersdifferently in the same jurisdiction and with completeimpunity; future taxpayers, of course, are entitled to re-liti-gate the issue over and over again, but as countless schol-
ars have pointed out, this result imposes a financial burden
on tax litigants that does not exist elsewhere in the law.38This impediment to uniformity, along with the other prob-lems identified, has led a number of commentators to argue
that Supreme Court intervention is particularly importantfor purposes of achieving uniformity and coherence in the
interpretation of federal tax rules.39
Scholars have made a strong case for uniformity in gen-
eral, and specifically in the tax context, but they alsodiscourage the Court from placing too much emphasis on
this goal. A lack of uniformity is not always intolerable andin some contexts it may be beneficial at least in the short
run. Disagreement among the lower federal courts enables
percolation and independent evaluation of legal issues by
38. See Martin D. Ginsburg, The Federal Courts Study Committee on ClaimsCourt Tax Jurisdiction, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 633 (1990) (stating that
anyone who can afford to litigate a tax issue will do so in the forum that is most
likely to issue a winning decision).
39. See ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 35, at 57 (noting that the tax
arena is particularly susceptible to considerations of forum shopping andplanning by multi-circuit actors); Carter, supra note 10 at 885-93 (achieving
uniform treatment of federal taxpayers is the goal of judicial system); Ginsburg,
supra note 38, at 635 ("It ought to be clear that the present system of tax
adjudication does promote uncertainty, incoherence, and, comparing theposition of wealthy and less wealthy taxpayers, perceptible unfairness as
well."); Hon. Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The Tax Litigation Process: Where It Is
and Where It is Going, in 44 THE RECORD 825, 841 (1989) ("the uniformity of
treatment of all taxpayers wherever located... should be the hallmark of any
system of taxation."). Scholars, however, rarely note that Supreme Courtdecisions can lead to a lack of uniformity due to the interplay of the federal and
state rules. This happened when the Supreme Court decided Poe v. Seaborn,282 U.S. 101 (1930), and permitted married couples to split their income. TheCourt created precedent for treating married taxpayers in common law statesdifferently than couples residing in community property states. For a terrificdiscussion of the problem, see EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (2000).
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different courts. As Professors Samuel Estreicher and John
Sexton point out:
"[t]he process of percolation allows a period of exploratory
consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the
Supreme Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule.
The Supreme Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue, thus
has the benefit of the experience of those lower courts, often
yielding concrete information about how a particular rule will
"'write,"' its capacity for dealing with varying fact patterns, and
the merits of alternative approaches."4 °
Moreover, permitting a conflict to percolate for a period
of time may eliminate the conflict among federal courts as
they might naturally reach accord over the course of time as
judges observe various courts outside their jurisdiction
issuing different-and possibly better-outcomes than their
own courts initially reached.
Conflict alone, therefore, is not, and perhaps should not
be, sufficient for purposes of granting certiorari; in fact, the
language of Rule 10 indicates as much when it suggests
that cert-worthy petitions are those that involve not only
divergent decisions but also raise an "important [legal]
matter" that "should be" decided by the Court.4' Thus, Rule
10 implies that conflict is a relevant consideration, but not
adequate for getting a hearing on the merits in the
Supreme Court. The additional salience requirement found
in Rule 10 is sensible given that it promotes the allocation
of Supreme Court resources to issues that provoke long-
term and irreconcilable conflict among the circuits and at
the same time assures that the legal questions are substan-
tial and far-reaching. The "important" cases the Court
agrees to take will more likely impact a range of individuals
and interests beyond those associated with the litigants
themselves. The additional proviso, in effect, guarantees
the Court will grant certiorari and decide cases with the
most profound implications for law and policy relative to
the effort required to hear and decide the case. The prob-
lem, of course, is that without a definition of "important" it
is difficult to discern between cases that are cert-worthy
and those that are not ex ante. We know that once the Court
40. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 35, at 48.
41. SuP. CT. R. 10.
42. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 1111.
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agrees to hear a case, the Justices view the issue as impor-
tant, but can we differentiate the weighty issues from the
petty cases prior to that time, or are they simply those that
the Court says are important?
Scholars interested in the certiorari process have inves-
tigated this question from both a normative and descriptive
perspective. Those with a normative bent have argued that
the Court should examine the legal and economic costs of
permitting a conflict to exist in lower federal courts for
purposes of determining the relative importance of a case
and grant certiorari only when the costs-which include ex-ploitation of inconsistent legal rules through forum shop-
ping and interference with domestic and international
commercial concerns-exceed the benefits.43 Others argue
the Court should not attempt to define "important" cases
beyond using a definition that calls for the Justices to adopt
a managerial role for the Court, making affirmative use ofits decision making powers by prioritizing cases that
involve (1) inter-court conflicts that clearly involve a
disagreement over a particular legal doctrine that governs
recurring and typical fact patterns, (2) conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent, or (3) inter-branch disputes."
The problem with these normative prescriptions is that
they ignore inevitable resource constraints-thousands of
litigants file certiorari petitions each year and many satisfy
the criteria set forth in the normative literature.4 In fact,
this is precisely the tax bar's criticism of the Supreme
Court's current certiorari process: the Court is not equipped
to decide every tax case that involves conflicts among
federal decision makers, and this is especially true given
the IRS's ability to issue a nonacquiescence letter with
regard to any given court decision. Thus, as the tax scholars
note, not only do the federal courts create conflict among
themselves, but the IRS routinely generates it through its
ability to refuse to adhere to any court opinion as precedent.
The rules grounded in normative concerns not only
ignore judicial resource limitations, but they also prioritize
43. See Sturley, supra note 35, at 1256-74 (investigating two maritime
statutes and arguing the Court should tolerate conflict in one context but not
the other).
44. See ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 35, at 52-62.
45. See Ulmer, supra note 34, at 905-06 tbls.1 & 2 (providing data on the
number of genuine and alleged conflicts raised in certiorari petitions during the
Vinson, Warren, and Burger Court eras).
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conflict and suggest that it should always be a condition for
getting certiorari in the high Court. And yet, cases exist
that do not involve decisional conflict, but other factors that
should counsel the Court to accept the case for a plenary
hearing. These additional factors are likely to be unique to
individual areas of the law and may involve "intolerable
consensus" in the lower courts rather than "intolerable con-
flicts;"" for example, circuit court rulings that lead to an
unjustifiable interpretation of the Constitution-or uniform
circuit court rulings that are exceptionally costly to the
federal budget.
The normative literature addresses what the Court
should do, but a second literature investigates what the
Justices actually do. This second literature finds some truth
to the normative views set forth above, but adds additional
insights into the agenda setting process-whether the
Court should deem these additional case factors salient is
not a question the empirical scholars seek to answer.
Rather they hope only to describe what the Court does
when faced with thousands of petitioners seeking a review
of a lower court decision. To that end, the extant empirical
literature has identified a number of variables that help to
explain how the Court defines "compelling" for purposes of
Rule 10, including: (1) the existence of genuine (as opposed
to alleged) inter-court conflict,46 (2) the Solicitor General as
a party," (3) two or more amicus briefs on file,48 (4) the
direction of the lower court's decision (Justices are more
likely to take a case for purposes of reversal),49 and (5) the
ideological orientation of the Court (liberal Courts are more
likely to grant certiorari to conservative lower court deci-
sions for purposes of reversal)." The first three variables
46. Id. at 901-11; see also S. Sidney Ulmer, Conflict with Supreme Court
Precedents and the Granting of Plenary Review, 45 J. POL. 474, 474-78 (1983).
47. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General
During the Warren and Burger Courts, 41 W. POL. Q. 135, 135-44 (1988); see
also LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE (1987) (arguing that the Solicitor
General's impact on the outcome is so great that he or she might be described as
a member of the Court).
48. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 1115-22
49. See Virginia C. Armstrong & Charles A. Johnson, Certiorari Decisions by
the Warren & Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory Time Bound?, 15 POLITY 141, 141-
50 (1982) (stating that the Justices were more likely to grant a writ when the
lower court favored civil rights than when the decision went against the claim).
50. See GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (1959) (stating that the liberal court in the 1940s chose to hear FELA
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highlight the type of the case and the parties involved while
the fourth and fifth factors suggest that outcome-oriented
concerns motivate the Court. Empirical scholars offer useful
explanations for why these factors explain the Court's deci-
sion at the certiorari stage (and the most sophisticated
study in the literature accounts for all of them in a single
statistical model).5'
The role of conflict in the decision to hear a case is not a
surprise given that the Supreme Court's formal rules on
certiorari suggests it is an important factor and nearly all
scholars interested in the certiorari process suggest it
should be. Moreover, many scholars have predicted the
Justices will defer to the Solicitor General in Supreme
Court litigation given the Solicitor General's status as a re-
peat player and the fact that he is unlikely to expend
resources on any but the most important cases-those with
national implications.2 The Justices rationally assume that
when the Solicitor General chooses to petition the Court for
review, the case satisfies the underlying goals of Rule 10."
With regard to amicus briefs filed in support or in opposi-
tion to certiorari, Professors Caldeira and Wright suggest
this participation also signals the Justices that the case is
important not only to the named parties but to a broader
constituency. As Caldeira and Wright note, "the potential
significance of a case is proportional to the demand for
adjudication among affected parties and that the amount of
cases that were decided against vorkers in circuit courts and in which the
workers had the best chance of winning on the merits in the Supreme Court).
51. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 1115-22.
52. See id. (noting that the Solicitor General's office has a unique role in
Supreme Court litigation and has remarkable success in convincing Justices to
grant certiorari); see also Stewart A. Baker, A Practical Guide to Certiorari, 33
CATH. U. L. Rev. 611, 623 (1984) (same); Lawless & Murray, supra note 14, at
112-13 (same).
53. Evidence in Justice Blackmun's files support this contention. See
Container 518, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. (containing a preliminary memorandum in U.S. v.
Stuart indicating the case "presents a square conflict... and the SG strongly
argues the case is of great importance. Combined with the usual deference
given to the SG, these factors indicate plenary review is warranted."); but see,
Stark, supra note 5, at 213 (arguing Justice Jackson's experience in the IRS and
the Solicitor General's office fostered distrust in the government's litigation
positions).
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amicus curiae participation reflects the demand for adjudi-
cation.
"
,
4
Finally, the fact that a statistically significant correla-
tion exists between the Justices' decision to grant certiorari
and their decision to reverse on the merits, suggests the
Court is far more result oriented than many scholars seem
to believe.5' Given resource constraints, this reversal strat-
egy is sensible: if the Justices agree with the lower court
decision there is little incentive to change the status quo
because the costs of reviewing may be considerable but the
overall result does not change. Justices, then, are efficient
in their decision to grant review to the cases they wish to
reverse.56 Most agree this cost/benefit calculation alone is
not sufficient to explain certiorari decisions but the addi-
tional underlying reasons for the strategy are unclear-
some argue the Court grants plenary review to cases it
intends to reverse as a means to correct legal errors, and
others argue the technique is useful for a Court that is
driven to reverse outcomes that are inconsistent with its
ideological agenda.57 The existing studies on the question do
not offer a conclusive explanation for the Justices'
motivations when voting to grant or deny a hearing. 8
54. Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 1112; see also id. (stating that the
logic of the repeat player applies to the participation of organized interests: the
groups and interests generally possess more information about a case than the
Court, and the Justices (and clerks) are generally not in a position to discern
the reliability of information in the short term, but as the organized groups
repeatedly participate in the process they build a reputation for trustworthiness
and can be counted on to identify "compelling" cases in the long term); Kevin T.
McGuire & Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of
Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 717, 719
(1993) (theorizing various litigants' roles in Supreme Court certiorari process);
see generally Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae before the
Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990)
(describing and comparing the variety and types of individuals and
organizations that file briefs supporting or opposing writs of certiorari).
55. Neither the normative nor the descriptive legal scholarship on certiorari
addresses this factor. See, e.g., ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 35, at 52-62
(stating that a normative discussion of certiorari focused on conflict and intra-
branch disputes, but not on outcomes or results of litigation on the merits);
Lawless & Murray, supra note 14 at 118-22 (containing a statistical model that
does not include reversal as an explanatory variable).
56. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 1111-12.
57. See Boucher & Segal, supra note 26 (summarizing competing claims and
finding data inconclusive for resolving debate).
58. See id.
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Professors Caldeira and Wright are the only scholars
who control for all the possible explanatory variables listed
above. They found that the presence of the Solicitor General
as a petitioner had the greatest impact on the certiorari
decision, followed by the existence of amicus briefs and
actual conflict. The inclination to reverse had the least im-
pact on the Justice's vote to grant or deny certiorari.
Focusing on the interaction of these three variables,59
Caldeira and Wright estimate that the probability of get-
ting a plenary hearing on the merits with two of the three
important factors present in the litigation is between
eighty-eight and ninety-six percent; with just one of the
three variables present, the estimated probability of getting
a hearing decreases to between thirty-three and thirty-
seven percent; and without the presence of the Solicitor
General, a conflict, or amicus briefs, the likelihood of get-
ting a writ of certiorari falls to just one percent."
Caldeira and Wright's model for predicting certiorari
decisions had great success in predicting outcomes: they
accurately predicted eighty percent of all the certiorari de-
cisions during the 1982 term when the Court considered
1,771 petitions and granted review in just 141 cases. The
model has also had success in specific issue areas involving
civil rights claims,61 but no scholar has used it for purposes
of understanding the Court's decision to grant certiorari in
business cases or in taxation cases specifically. I do not
undertake this type of empirical study here; rather I argue
the model may be underspecified (notwithstanding the nu-
merous explanatory variables included) for purposes of
identifying all the relevant explanations for granting certio-
rari in taxation disputes. After reviewing Justice
Blackmun's case files I have reason to believe that we could
improve upon the model by taking into consideration factors
associated with the federal fisc and the Solicitor General's
position when expressing a view on certiorari as a respon-
59. The authors controlled for ideology when generating the probabilities.
Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 1120-21.
60. Id. at 1121-22.
61. See McGuire & Caldeira, supra note 54, at 722-25 (using the model to
understand certiorari decisions in the context of obscenity cases); see also
Lawless & Murray, supra note 14, at 118-32 (adopting a statistical approach
investigating cert decisions in the bankruptcy context but ignoring amicus
curiae).
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dent (not petitioner)" in the case. Because I examined only
the tax cases that received a plenary hearing-and not the
cases the Court refused to hear-I cannot discern whether
these factors have a strong role to play in the decision
making process. This essay, therefore, serves to highlight
possible avenues for useful research in the future."
II. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S PAPERS: INSIGHT INTO THE
CERTIORARI PROCESS
For purposes of this study, I focused on the forty-one
tax cases that the Supreme Court decided between the 1986
and 1993 terms.6 Each case file contained a range of
materials including some or all of the following: (1) a
preliminary memorandum written by a law clerk and
circulated to members of the cert pool outlining the parties'
arguments for and against a writ of certiorari and including
the law clerk's assessment of the case; (2) a bench memo-
randum outlining the parties' arguments on the merits and
including the law clerk's viewpoints; (3) Justice Blackmun's
personal notes regarding the case and the issues that arose
during oral argument; (4) Justice Blackmun's personal
notes taken while the Justices discussed the case after oral
argument with a conference tally indicating how each
Justice intended to vote on the merits; (5) drafts of the ma-
jority, concurring, and dissenting opinions with changes
highlighted or identified in the margin; (6) correspondence
among the Justices regarding the draft opinions; (7) letters
from members of the tax bar offering insight into cases or
commenting on case outcomes; (8) news articles describing
the case and the implications of the decision; (9) portions of
62. The literature accounts for the Solicitor General's participation as a
petitioner but not as a respondent. As I note below, the Solicitor General argues
for certiorari even when the case was won below, and this fact may be highly
correlated with the Court's decisions to grant a full hearing. See infra notes 71-
73 and accompanying text.
63. In the forty-one cases I investigate, seventy-three percent involved a
conflict in the lower courts or with Supreme Court precedent; the Solicitor
General's office was the petitioner in fifty-six percent of the cases granted
certiorari; and in seventeen percent of the cases, one or more amicus curiae filed
a brief in support or in opposition to the certiorari.
64. I chose this time period for two reasons (1) Chief Justice Rehnquist was
the Chief Justice for this entire time period, offering some uniformity to the
decision making process, and (2) I worked under time constraints. The cases are
listed in the index attached to this article.
AGENDA SETTING 9072004]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the congressional record indicating the legislators' intent
when adopting the tax provision at issue or their
subsequent response to a decided case; and (10) random
documents ranging from intra-court emails to notes passed
between the Justices during oral argument.
Because my focus in this essay is the certiorari decision,
I discuss only the preliminary memoranda-law clerk
authored documents evaluating petitions for certiorari-
and set aside the documents in the file that do not bear on
this topic. 65 These memoranda include a description of the
legal controversy, the lower court decisions, the petitioners'
arguments for certiorari, the respondent's arguments
opposing (or supporting) certiorari, amicus' arguments on
the issue, and finally Justice Blackmun's law clerk mark-
up, indicating whether or not the Court should grant
certiorari.
Rule 10 indicates the Court will bear in mind inter-
court conflict when determining whether or not to grant
plenary review on a case and the preliminary memoranda
offer evidence that the Justices do just that: all the files
include a memorandum discussing the existence of, and the
potential problems associated with, inter-court conflict. The
authors of the preliminary memos generally first identified
whether the parties alleged decisional conflict and then
offered his or her own assessment of the matter. For the
most part, the parties and the law clerk agreed on the ques-
tion but at times disagreement existed and the law clerk
addressed the matter in some detail in an effort to deter-
mine which party had the better argument. For example, in
U.S. v. Burke, the Solicitor General maintained that his
office identified a problematic circuit split among the Forth,
Fifth, and Sixth circuits on the tax treatment of back pay
65. Justice Lewis Powell first suggested that the Court create a certiorari
pool in 1972 for purposes of evaluating the thousands of petitions filed with the
Court each year. According to various former Supreme Court law clerks and
authors, all the Justices on the Court, with the exception of Justice Stevens,
belongs to the certiorari pool. The Justices assign certain chambers to write a
single memo on each petition for Court-wide circulations. See Palmer, supra
note 16, at 105-08. My own review of the documents indicated that the law clerk
responsible for writing the memo generally summarizes the facts, the legal
issues, the lower court outcomes (including dissents and concurrences), the
parties' arguments (including those found in amicus briefs) supporting or
opposing certiorari, and their own view of the case. Justice Blackmun's own
clerk then examined the memorandum, identified the author, and evaluated the
arguments for and against a writ of certiorari-all in handwritten mark-ups.
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awards while Burke's lawyers argued that the split was ir-
relevant given that the case at hand involved the taxation
of damages, and not back pay awards.6 The law clerk sided
with the Solicitor General's office, noting that the taxpay-
ers' "new-found belief that their suit was for damages and
not back pay flies in the face of their own complaint and the
district court's undisturbed finding to the contrary."7 The
author of the preliminary memorandum then gave her own
viewpoint on the cert decision, "[the case is probably not
that important (I doubt there is much money at stake).
Nonetheless, because of the fairly deep split, I recommend
that the Court grant the petition. ' Justice Blackmun's own
law clerk, who did not write the preliminary memorandum
but reviewed it for Blackmun, added a handwritten note
confirming the view of the original author "[t] here is a clear
split.., therefore, I recommend a grant.' 9 If the law clerks'
memoranda and commentary indeed offer any insight into
the Court's understanding of a case, it appears the clerk's
assessment of the split is a key factor for the Court when
deciding whether or not to hear a case on the merits: sev-
enty-eight percent of the cases that I reviewed involved a
so-called square conflict.7 °
Burke was a case that involved the Solicitor General as
the petitioner, as well as a deep split in the circuit courts on
the issue presented. The descriptive literature suggests
these two factors together lead the Court to hear the case
eighty-eight to ninety-six percent of the time-and in fact
the Court did give Burke a full hearing. The claim that the
Solicitor General's decision to seek Supreme Court review
signals the importance of the case is generally confirmed in
the preliminary memos found in the taxation context. Often
the deference is implicit--discernable only by the fact that
the law clerks frequently adopt the Solicitor General's view
presented in a brief supporting or opposing a full hearing.
At times, however, the deference is explicit; for example,
66. See Container 597, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., (containing the preliminary
memorandum in U.S. v. Burke, at 5-6).
67. Id. at 5-6.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 7.
70. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 35, at 54 (describing a "square
conflict" as a conflict when two or more courts-federal courts of appeals or
state courts of last resort-'take contrary positions on the same legal issue).
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one law clerk advocated certiorari, in part, based on the
"usual deference given the Solicitor General's office."71 In
the forty-one tax cases that reached the Supreme Court for
a full hearing, the Solicitor General supported this decision
in eighty-three percent of the cases; in twenty-three of the
cases, the Solicitor General petitioned the Court for review
and in another eleven cases, his office supported a plenary
hearing as the respondent in the case.
The existing literature on certiorari seems to assume
the Solicitor General will support plenary review when the
government loses in the circuit court but will oppose a
hearing on the merits when the government won below. 2
One might ask why the government, as a respondent, would
ever support Supreme Court review in a case in which it
won in the lower court-why not protect the win by avoid-
ing review altogether? The explanation may have to do with
the fact that the government prevails in the vast majority of
cases that go to the Supreme Court-on average seventy
percent of the time. Accordingly, if the Solicitor General is
faced with a situation in which the IRS won in the specific
dispute at hand but faces a conflict on the issue in the
circuit courts generally-then the government would
strongly favor a decision by the Supreme Court that estab-
lishes a uniform rule giving the IRS the winning outcome in
every circuit across the country. Indeed, even if the lower
courts have not generated a conflict, the Solicitor General's
support for a writ of certiorari would be a rational choice-
an aggressive means to achieve a national rule on an impor-
tant and new issue. In fact, note that the Solicitor General
supports certiorari in eighty-three percent of the cases, and
has a similar win rate in the Supreme Court-if he accu-
rately predicts outcomes (which cases he will win and which
he will lose) then he is undertaking exactly the right strat-
egy to the certiorari process.73
71. See Container 518, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (containing a preliminary memorandum
in U.S. v. Stuart recommending certiorari based on the "usual deference to
Solicitor General").
72. See, e.g., Lawless & Murray, supra note 14, at 113 (noting the Court is
more likely to grant certiorari even when the Solicitor General is a respondent
and arguing this is because the government's participation in any case suggests
issues of "of public importance" are at hand, ignoring the possibility that the
government may support a writ of certiorari even as a respondent).
73. The literature on certiorari is filled with discussion about the Justices'
strategies to achieve preferred outcomes-the use 'of defensive denials and
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The preliminary memoranda in the Blackmun files also
suggest a third mechanism the Court uses for identifying
compelling cases in the certiorari process. Recall the law
clerk's comment in the Burke case suggesting the dispute
was unimportant given the amount of "money at stake" in
the case. Virtually every preliminary memorandum filed in
the forty-one cases I examined included some discussion of
tax costs, and most implied that an "important tax case"
was one that had considerable financial implications for the
U.S. Treasury. In many cases, the memorandum identified
the actual numbers involved. For example, in U.S. v. Hill, a
case that involved the alternative minimum tax for oil and
gas revenue, the law clerk wrote:
The fiscal consequences of the case are enormous. From 1985 to
1989 alone, the IRS reports that more than $5 billion of revenue
from the minimum tax on tax preference income is affected by this
decision. Since that decision below, the IRS has already received
refund claims aggregating over $400 million ... the revenue losses
to the government as a result of this ruling therefore will be at
least one billion dollars a year and could 
be much more.
4
Many other memoranda contain similar language. In
U.S. v. Centennial Savings Bank, the law clerk wrote that if
the Supreme Court permitted the lower court opinion to
stand, it would impact at least 108 cases with more than
$128 million at stake in taxes;" in U.S. v. Goodyear, the law
clerk indicated that "a grant would help with the deficit"
because this issue involved "more than $900 million in tax
credits" over the course of time;76 in Commissioner v.
aggressive grants-but no scholar addresses this same concern when it comes to
repeat players. See, e.g., Boucher & Segal, supra note 26, at 829-36 (discussing
the possibility that Justices may vote to deny certiorari as a means to avoid a
particular outcome, but may vote to grant certiorari in cases in which they have
a high probability of winning a majority and an outcome they prefer); see also
Krol & Brenner, supra note 26, at 335-37 (same).
74. See Container 615, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (containing a preliminary memorandum,
U.S. v. Hill, at 9-10).
75. See Container 573, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (containing a preliminary memorandum
in U.S. v. Centennial Savings Bank).
76. See Container 548, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (containing a preliminary memorandum
in U.S. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber, at 18-19).
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Indianapolis Power, the author wrote that "more than 150
cases involving more than $300 million in potential tax
liabilities" were implicated by the lower court decision;" inColonial American Life Insurance v. Commissioner, the
memo indicated that the dispute was significant given thatit involved tax consequences of more than $1.78 trillion in
reinsured life insurance funds."7 These claims are but a few
examples found in the Blackmun papers highlighting theparties' continual focus on potential revenue costs to theTreasury. These examples-along with the law clerk's use
of the numbers in advising the Court to grant or deny cer-tiorari-suggest that a lower court's impact on the federalfisc is an important factor in the decision making process. 9Of course, government allegations about the fiscal costs
of a lower court decision do not make them a reality. Law
clerks, in fact, did not always accept government claims
about the financial implications of denying certiorari and
often independently considered the problem. In U.S. v.Dalm, a case involving the doctrine of equitable recoupment
and time-barred claims, the Solicitor General argued that
the issue was recurring and for that reason could have alarge impact on the fisc. The author of the memorandum
questioned this claim on the grounds that the "doctrine of
"equitable recoupment arises only on rare occasions-when
one party is able to use the statute of limitations to have itboth ways-the government to collect two inconsistent
taxes on the same money... or the taxpayer to pay notax." ° And as the law clerk noted it was not at all "clearhow often this happens,""1 suggesting the fiscal costs of
refusing to hear the case were not an independent reason
for granting certiorari.
77. See Container 547, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (preliminary memorandum in
Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power, at 9).78. See Container 534, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (preliminary memorandum in ColonialAmerican Life Insurance v. Commissioner, at 7).
79. See Stark, supra note 5, at 205-06 (quoting a brief by Solicitor General,
and later Justice, Robert Jackson, implying the predictability of the effect onfederal revenues is a proper consideration in the certiorari process).80. See Container 551, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (preliminary memorandum in U.S. v.
Dalm, at 9).
81. Id.
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The monetary costs presented and analyzed in cases
such as Hill, Centennial Savings Bank, Goodyear Tire &
Rubber, Indianapolis Power, Colonial American Life, and
Dalm raise the question of whether costs actually serve as a
useful variable for understanding certiorari decisions. In
both Burke and Dalm, the law clerks considered the fiscal
costs to be minimal and yet they still suggested the Court
hear the case based on the existence of a deep conflict-and
in fact the Court did give the issues presented in the brief a
full hearing on the merits.82 In other cases, the interaction
between inter-court conflict and revenue costs worked in
just the opposite way. In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the
parties agreed no conflict existed-indeed, the author of the
preliminary memorandum noted that a circuit court conflict
would probably never emerge. The law clerk grounded this
prediction on the grounds that the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was the only court to consider the issue and
it decided for the taxpayer. This fact combined with the fact
that taxpayers all over the country have the right to file in
the Court of Federal Claims (cases appealed to the Federal
Circuit) meant that taxpayers with savvy counsel would
never challenge an IRS deficiency notice in any trial court
but the Court of Federal Claims. Notwithstanding the lack
of conflict, the law clerk noted that the fiscal consequences
of the Federal Circuit Court decisions were "enormous.
83
This insight led the law clerk to recommend that the
Justices "deny [certiorari] unless Treasury costs are an in-
dependent reason to grant."84 In fact, the Justices did un-
dertake a plenary review in Hill notwithstanding the lack
of conflict-suggesting that harmony and error on costly
matters may be intolerable and thus sufficient for the Court
to deem a case cert-worthy. Indeed, if the preliminary
82. See Container 597, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (containing a preliminary memorandum
in U.S. v. Burke recommending the Court grant certiorari even though the case
"is not too important" at least based on fiscal considerations); Container 551,
Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. (containing a preliminary memorandum in U.S. v. Dalm
indicating the law clerk had "reservations about the 'importance' of the issue,"
but nevertheless recommended the Court grant the petition given the conflict
among the appellate courts).
83. See Container 548, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (containing a preliminary memorandum
in U.S. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., at 18).
84. Id.
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memoranda are a good indication of why the Justices grant
certiorari in tax cases generally-then the files indicate
that sixty-one percent of the cases decided between 1986
and 1993 involved potential massive revenue losses for the
government.
The Blackmun papers highlight the law clerks' focus oninter-court conflict, the Solicitor General's arguments (in
both the role of petitioner and respondent), and the fiscal
costs involved in the case for purposes of recommending theCourt grant or deny certiorari. The preliminary memo-
randa, however, gave little attention to the role of amicus
curiae briefs but this may be due to the fact that few friends
of the court actually filed briefs in the taxation cases I
reviewed-only seven of the forty-one cases I examined in-
cluded amicus briefs at the certiorari stage. Moreover, thelaw clerks gave scant attention to the question of whether
or not the lower court decision was "right or wrong" and
thus offered little insight into the ongoing debate concern-ing the role of outcomes and results in the Justices' decision
to grant or deny certiorari in taxation cases. This reversal
rate factor, however, may have a lesser role in tax cases
than in other areas of the law. The percentage of cases in
which the Court reverses a lower court on the merits overallis sixty-six percent 85 but in the tax context this rate falls toforty-eight percent 6-suggesting the Court has a different
cost/benefit analysis and a different motivation for grants of
certiorari in unique areas of the law such as taxation. Thesepossibilities-the fact that few amicus filed briefs in
support or in opposition to certiorari and the fact that theCourt does not reverse the majority of cases it hears in the
tax context-as well as the new evidence uncovered in Jus-
tice Blackmun's files described above, all suggest exciting
new avenues for scholarly research on agenda setting in the
Supreme Court.
85. Computed from Harold Spaeth's Original United States Supreme CourtJudicial Database, at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdatal.html (last
updated Dec. 11, 2003; last visited Oct. 11, 2004). The variable under analysis is
"decision type."
86. This number is calculated from tax cases generally-the Supreme Courthas decided 1007 tax cases since 1909 when it adopted the first modern income
tax laws. See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, & Peter Wiedenbeck, Competing
Models of Statutory Interpretation (May 25, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
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III. FUTURE RESEARCH ON AGENDA SETTING IN THE SUPREME
COURT
As noted above, my conclusions about cert-worthy cases
must be qualified by the fact that my data set is small and
because I reviewed only cases that the Court agreed to hear
on the merits. To determine the full impact of the evidence
uncovered in the Blackmun papers, I plan to review the full
file-all the cases considered between 1970 and 1993 and
examine every preliminary memorandum addressing the
arguments for and against certiorari in tax cases. This more
complete study will enable me to discern whether the
factors I discussed above are important for understanding
judicial decisions or whether no correlation exists between
these variables and the cases the Court decides to hear on
the merits. Beyond this more comprehensive study of cer-
tiorari, the Blackmun papers highlight a number of impor-
tant new avenues for scholarly research.
A. Normative Considerations for Granting or Denying
Certiorari
The normative scholarship on certiorari prioritizes
conflict and to a lesser extent the commercial costs of not
hearing a case. The preliminary memoranda in the Black-
mun files suggest the Justices have directed their law
clerks to investigate this matter and the law clerks, in turn,
appear to work diligently to understand the true nature
and the potential problems of any alleged inter-court deci-
sional conflicts. In short, Justices appear to take conflict se-
riously in taxation controversies-as well as in virtually all
other contexts. 7
The focus on commercial costs in the extant literature,
however, is too narrow to encompass the range of concerns
the Supreme Court appears to have when considering the
disadvantages of not hearing a case in the tax context. The
type of costs enumerated in the normative literature-the
costs to both the litigants and the judicial system associated
with uncertain legal rules-are associated with inter-court
conflict. These are certainly relevant, but the Court also
appears to be concerned with costs outside this limited
definition of costs-fiscal costs to the U.S. government. The
87. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 13, at 1111-12.
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preliminary memoranda suggest the Court believes it
should grant a plenary review when fiscal costs are "enor-
mous" even when a consensus on a legal issue exists in thelower courts and no conflict exits with Supreme Courtprecedent. This is a factor that scholars interested in certio-
rari have completely ignored but should theorize before
reaching conclusions about the decision making process.For example, some scholars argue Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion in tax controversies should be limited, in part due to
the Justices' lack of expertise, and in part due to the factthat the Justices often fail to identify true conflicts in lowerfederal courts.88 But if closing loopholes and protecting thefisc from extraordinary revenue losses is a useful judicial
endeavor, then the legal errors and the lack of conflict maybe negative aspects that are far outweighed by the fiscal
benefits of a decision. 89
Of course, an unambiguous focus on revenue loss raises
a host of additional questions for scholars with a normativebent. For example, should the judicial focus on tax costs beheightened in eras with massive deficits? Similarly, should
the Court pay particular attention to this factor when
economists predict economic downturns-times when thefederal government is more likely to incur greater costs as-
sociated with unemployment, health, and welfare? At firstglance, it may seem that the Court is not equipped to
undertake these types of considerations and yet macroeco-
nomic concerns are not new to the Court.90 Many tax
scholars argue that the outcome in Cottage Savings v.Commissioner, a 1991 case in which the Court consideredloss deductions in the savings and loan context, makes
sense only if we take into account judicial concerns for thepossibility that the government was facing massive costs
associated with the S&L crisis in the late 1980s. Congress
appeared incapable of addressing the problem so the Court
stepped in and allowed unprecedented loss deductions as a
88. See Wolfman, supra note 8, at 1093-94.89. See Sturley, supra note 35, at 1275 ("concluding that sometimes
resolving a conflict incorrectly may be better than permitting the conflict to
stand.").
90. I investigate the questions above and other ideas in: Nancy Staudt, LeeEpstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, Competing Models of Statutory Interpretation(May 25, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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means to offset an impending financial disaster.9 While
Cottage Savings is an example of the Court expressing
willingness to incur revenue costs through the allowance of
loss deductions, presumably, the Justices reached the con-
clusion that these short-term costs were lower than the
long-term costs the government would suffer with the vast
number of S&L bankruptcies that seemed to be on the hori-
zon.
Finally, the normative literature ignores a facet of liti-
gation that both the published empirical studies, as well as
the Blackmun files, suggest is important: the Solicitor
General's important role in the Justices' decision to grant
certiorari. On the one hand, the Solicitor General's repeat
player status and his office's limited resources suggest he is
in a good position to identify important cases and to pursue
them into the Supreme Court-as both petitioner and re-
spondent. On the other hand, scholars should question the
propriety of giving deference to one party in the litigation;
in giving deference, the Court begins to look biased against
the taxpayer-never able to give a fair hearing to individu-
als (or entities) the government argues should contribute to
the public fisc. In fact, this deference leads to an unusually
high win rate for the federal government in the Supreme
Court in all legal contexts, and this finding holds true for
tax controversies as well, suggesting that the issue is ripe
for theorizing from a normative perspective.
B. Descriptive Considerations for Understanding the
Decision to Grant or Deny Certiorari
The empirical literature on certiorari provides useful
insights into the decision making process, but the literature
has several limitations that the Blackmun files highlight.
First, empirical scholars tend to seek an understanding of
judicial decision making generally and not in areas of
unique issues. Second, even when authors do investigate
91. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 221 (13th ed.
2003) (implying that politics explains both the agency, FHLBB, and Court
decision to allow the loss deduction). Interestingly, the file on Cottage Savings
v. Commissioner in the Blackmun papers did not indicate the Court had this
concern in mind either at the certiorari stage or when the Court issued the
opinion on the merits. See Container 573, Justice Blackmun Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (containing no explicit
discussion of macroeconomic concerns when deciding the merits of the case).
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specific issues areas, they focus on civil rights and ignore
areas of the law that involve complicated business transac-
tions. Business areas of the law, such as taxation, may
involve distinctive facts and circumstances. Because of this,
the existing statistical models devised for understanding
certiorari may be incorrect. For example, one manifest
omission in the extant literature is the failure to account forfiscal costs. The preliminary memoranda in the Blackmun
files suggest that revenue losses are positively correlated
with the Court's decision to grant a plenary hearing on the
merits. Whether this factor indeed has independent signifi-
cance-or is simply correlated with the Solicitor General's
participation in the litigation-should be explored before we
can fully understand certiorari decisions in tax cases.
Moreover, as noted above, the Court may well consider
fiscal costs as an important variable in determining which
cases are cert-worthy, but only in particular eras (for exam-
ple, when the deficit is high).
With regard to the parties involved in the litigation, the
existing models assume the Solicitor General will advocate
certiorari only as a petitioner but the preliminary memo-
randa make clear the government frequently supports aplenary hearing even when appearing as a respondent in
the case. This suggests the Solicitor General's office
engages in a strategy of seeking defensive denials (opposing
certiorari when there is a high probability of losing on the
merits) and aggressive grants (supporting certiorari when
there is high probability of winning on the merits).92 While
empiricists have investigated this possibility in the context
of the Justices and their votes to grant or deny a full hear-ing, no one has considered this same strategy on the part of
repeat players.93 Not only would an investigation of this
question expand our understanding of the certiorari process
as well our ability to predict decision making on the part of
all parties involved-but if the Solicitor General is in fact
successful in predicting when the Court will support it'slegal position (whether as a petitioner or respondent), then
we should also be able to successfully make this prediction
92. See Boucher & Segal, supra note 26, at 824-28 (describing strategies in
the judicial context).
93. See id.
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at the merits stage in tax cases-something few have tried
to do.
94
Finally, the empirical scholars are very good at pre-
dicting outcomes based on ideology in the civil rights
contexts but no one has attempted this same study in the
taxation context. Indeed, for the most part, empiricists have
eschewed business cases as fruitful arenas for understand-
ing the role of politics and, equally problematic, legal
scholars have failed to study systematically the role of judi-
cial politics in the adjudication of business disputes.
Nowhere is this failure more evident than in the taxation
context and yet social scientists routinely point to the tax
laws as the paradigmatic case of politics at work.95 Given
that politics are key for understanding House and Senate
votes on tax legislation, it is highly unlikely that politics
and ideology do not play a role in the judicial context as
well-understanding that role is far overdue. Although
students of political science often assume that Justices with
a conservative bent will vote for the taxpayer and those
with a liberal mindset will vote for the government, no seri-
ous studies have tested this proposition. Moreover, given
the range of areas that individuals litigate, this assumption
most likely does not hold true in all tax contexts-if it holds
true at all. For example, a low-income individual seeking to
take advantage of the earned income tax credit is probably
a more sympathetic litigant to liberal Justices than to those
with conservative politics. But these are the very questions
that empiricists should seek to answer with court-generated
data.
CONCLUSION
The Library of Congress recently opened Justice
Blackmun's personal papers for public viewing. The papers
94. But see Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting
Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. (2004) (using both a statistical model and
experts to predict Supreme Court outcomes and finding that the model
outperformed the experts).
95. See generally, RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES
(1973) (examining legislative activities and describing politics and strategies in
six committees including the House Ways and Means Committee); see also
Edward A. Zelinksy, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J.
1165 (1993) (investigating legislative tax politics).
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are unique in that Justice Blackmun retained a number of
documents pertaining to the certiorari decision that most
other Justices discard. This data may offer exciting new
insights into the Court's decision making procedures. For
purposes of this essay, I reviewed forty-one case files on
taxation disputes decided between 1986 and 1993. I found
data suggesting that the Justices (and their law clerks)
privilege inter-court conflict, the Solicitor General's support
for certiorari, and the fiscal costs of not hearing a case when
considering the arguments for and against plenary review.
These findings are preliminary, given that I looked only to
the cases the Court decided on the merits; 'further research
is necessary for understanding fully how these factors
impact judicial decisions. At this early stage of my research,
however, the Blackmun files suggest that while the Justices
detest tax cases, they are willing to put them on their dis-
cretionary docket in an effort to protect the federal budget.
Moreover, this fact may undermine the calls for curtailing
Supreme Court jurisdiction-it may take judicial interven-
tion to save the budget from irresponsible public spending
in the legislative context.
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INDEX OF FEDERAL TAX CASES, 1986-1993 TERMS
1. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
2. United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994).
3. Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508
U.S. 152 (1993).
4. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507
U.S. 546 (1993).
5. United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447 (1993).
6. Bufferd v. Comm'r, 506 U.S. 523 (1993).
7. United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546 (1993).
8. Comm'r v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168 (1993).
9. United States v. Thompson Ctr. Arms Co, 504 U.S.
505 (1992).
10. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
11. INDOPCO v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
12. United States v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992).
13. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
14. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
15. United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank, 499 U.S.
573 (1991).
16. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
17. Portland Golf Club v. Comm'r, 497 U.S. 154 (1990).
18. Beiger v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
19. United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545
(1990).
20. Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
21. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
22. Comm'r v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co,
493 U.S. 203 (1990).
23. United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493
U.S. 132 (1989).
24. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
25. Colonial Amer. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 491 U.S.
244 (1989).
26. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
27. Graham v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
28. Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989).
29. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
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30. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).*
31. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351
(1988).
32. Comm'r v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988).
33. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm'r, 485 U.S. 212
(1988).
34. Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9 (1987).
35. Comm'r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3 (1987).
36. Comm'r v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987).
37. Comm'r v. Asphalt, 482 U.S. 117 (1987).
38. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239
(1987).
39. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
40. Wimberly v. Missouri, 479 U.S. 511 (1987).**
41. Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States, 479 U.S.
442 (1987).
This case was in the Court's original jurisdiction and thus governed by
Supreme Court Rule 17. Rule 17, however, does not mandate the Justices grant
every motion for leave to file in the Court's original jurisdiction; the Justices in
fact have denied many parties a plenary hearing seeking review under this rule.
See Patrick T. Mottola, Note, New Jersey v. New York, 1185 S.Ct. 1726 (1998), 9
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1113, 1119-20 (1999) (noting the Court rarely hears
cases in its original jurisdiction and summarizing the Justices' reasons for
limiting the docket in this context). For this reason, I include South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), in this study.
Although the United States is not a participant in this litigation, the case
involves a judicial interpretation of federal unemployment taxes and for this
reason I include it in my discussion here.
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